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Keep the tongue in your mouth a prisoner.
Turkish Proverb
1. INTRODUCTION: ARTICLE 301 AS A THREAT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
When Turkey implemented its new penal code in June of 2005, hope of
improved protections for constitutional rights and freedoms accompanied it.
These hopes proved to be short-lived, however, because it soon became
evident that the new Turkish Penal Code was devoid of some of the most
important protections: the right to freely speak one's thoughts and the right to
respectfully dissent against your government. The biggest threat to these
hopes is Article 301 of the new penal code. By making it a crime to insult
"Turkishness," or to denigrate the Government of Turkey, Article 301
threatens what has been universally recognized as one of the most fundamental
rights: the freedom of expression.'
Article 301 of the new penal code preserves Article 159 of the prior penal
code.2 Further, Article 159, which criminalizes "insults" against state
institutions, "has been used to prosecute and imprison those [who] have made
peaceful criticisms."3 When Article 301 was first enacted in 2005, it stated:
1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by
imprisonment of between six months and three years.
2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of
Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or
security structures shall be punishable by imprisonment of
between six months and two years.
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a
Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be
increased by one third.
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not
constitute a crime.4
HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMrrTEE, HuMAN RIGHTS ANN.
REP. 2005,2005-6, H.C. 574, at Ev 19, para. 152.
2 Id.
3Id.
4 TCRKCEZAKANUNU [TURKISH PENALCODE] art. 301 (2005) (amended 2008), translated
in Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Turkey: Article 301 Is a Threat to Freedom of Expression and
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Article 301 has been featured in high profile cases in Turkey involving the
prosecution of journalists, artists, and writers charged with denigrating the
government.5 Article 301 has even sanctioned restrictions on access to the
Internet; on March 7, 2007, access to YouTube, a prominent website used for
video sharing, was banned in Turkey in accordance with a court order.6 This
decision followed the posting of a video on YouTube insulting Mustafa Kemal
Atatfirk, the modem founder of Turkey.7 This ban, however, only lasted two
days; after complying, Turkey's leading internet service provider successfully
petitioned the court to restore access to the site on the condition that the videos
in question be removed.' Many criticized the court's initial ban, likening it to
"'closing a whole library because of a single book which was found
improper. ' '
The United States and various human rights organizations criticize
Article 301 as being a threat to freedom of expression and consider the Article
to be at odds with Turkey's international legal obligations.'l The opponents
of Article 301 demand that Turkey immediately abolish the Article." The
most vocal of these opponents is the European Union (EU), which in the past
Must Be Repealed Now! (Dec. 1,2005), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=
ENGEUR440352005. Since this Note was written, the Turkish Parliament amended Article 301
in April 23, 2008. However, the changes are largely superficial and do not alter the substantive
analysis of this Note. See infra Part V.
5 VERITY CAMPBELL ET AL., TURKEY 51 (10th ed. 2007).
6 Sangamitra Ramachander, Internet Filtering in Europe, in ACCEss DENIED: THE PRACTICE
AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 189 (Ronald Diebert et al. eds., 2008).
7 Id. See also Posting of Tom Zeller Jr. to The Lede, http://www.thelede.blogs.nytimes.
com/2007/03/07/youtube-banned-in-turkey-after-insults-to-ataturk/ (Mar. 7, 2007, 09:59 EST)
(describing that the video clips were created as a part of an online exchange between ethnic
Turks and Greeks wherein Ataturk was spuriously referred to as a homosexual).
See Ramachander, supra note 6, at 189-90.
9 YouTube Blocked for 2 Days in Turkey, EDRI-GRAM, Mar. 14,2007, http://www.edri.org/
edrigram/number5.5/youtube-turkey (quoting a common declaration published by seventeen non-
governmental organizations in the information technology field).
"0 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 4, para. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 19, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds ....");
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocol 11) [hereinafter European Convention
on Human Rights] ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.").
" See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 4 (describing Amnesty International's objections).
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refused to negotiate with Turkey over its potential membership into the EU
because of Turkey's "problematic record [with] human rights."12 Amidst the
criticism, Turkey continues to support Article 301, and instead of repealing the
Article, the Turkish government "has repeatedly argued that laws similar to
Article 301 exist in other European countries and that Turkey needs such a
law."' 3 Even though the government has not stated definitively why "Turkey
needs such a law," one could speculate that the need may be driven by a desire
to maintain the integrity of the Turkish identity.
Part II of this Note will trace the development of the Turkish identity and
the nexus between maintaining this identity and the enactment of Article 301.
This Part will examine the history of Turkey, starting with the fall of the
Ottoman Empire and the current national identity crisis between Turkish-
Kurds and Turkish nationalists. Turkish-Kurds seek to increase their
participation in the political system and gain the rights shared by all Turkish
citizens, while Turkish nationalists aim to maintain the secular nature of the
country. Turkish nationalists believe that "separatism underlies any expression
of Kurdish interests," and this belief motivates the Turkish nationalists'
12 JANET DINE ET AL., COMPANY LAW IN THE NEW EUROPE: THE EU ACQUIS, COMPARATIVE
METHODOLOGY AND MODEL LAW 89 (2007). In December of 2005, the EU declared its intention
to "closely watch the trial of Orhan Pamuk, accused of insulting Turkish national identity after an
interview about the Armenian genocide." Id. at n.75. Their vigilance is intended to test Turkey's
European credentials. Id. However, Olli Rehn, the Enlargement Commissioner has warned Turkey
that the Turkish Penal Code will have to be amended so that it conforms to European Union
standards. Id. See also Olli Rehn, EU Comm'r for Enlargement, Accession Negotiations with
Turkey: The Journey Is as Important as the Final Destination, Speech before the European
Parliament Plenary Session (Sept. 28,2005), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/
2004_2009/documents/fd/d-tr20051123_12/d-tr20051123_12en.pdf (encouraging Turkey "to
continue and accelerate its process of internal transformation and its transition towards a fully
fledged liberal democracy respectful of human rights and minorities"). See also Nicole F. Watts,
Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West. Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in
International Affairs, in BOUNDARIES AND BELONGING: STATES AND SOCIETIES IN THE STRUGGLE
TO SHAPE IDENTImIs AND LOCAL PRACTICES 121, 133 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 2004) ("In 1996 the
European Community received more complaints against Turkey than any other country ...
[European Court of Human Rights] rulings have placed tremendous political, moral, and financial
pressure on Turkey .... "). Statistics further show that by December of 1998, a quarter of the
ECHR's pending applications, 1,825 cases out of 7,771, were against Turkey and seventy percent
of those cases involved Kurds. Id.
'" Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Government Amendments Will Not Protect Free Speech
(Apr. 17, 2008), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/17turkeyl 8591 .htm. However, Human
Rights Watch notes that while it may be true that other countries have similar laws, such
"antiquated laws" are rarely used in these countries. Id. However, in Turkey, the situation is
quite different: 1533 individuals stood trial under Article 301 in 2006 alone and another 1189
stood trial in the first quarter of 2007. Id.
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"unwillingness to expand Kurdish cultural rights and political opportunities."' 4
This Part will focus on how the history of Turkey and the establishment of the
Turkish identity with the presence of so many different ethnic groups has led
some Turkish citizens to desire a democracy and others to desire a more
authoritarian regime that will protect the traditional Turkish identity. This
authoritarian regime is what drives the desire to keep Article 301 intact.
Part III traces the history of Article 301 and explores its immediate effects.
Legally, Article 301 effectively nullifies the clause of the Turkish Constitution
that reads: "In the case of a conflict between international agreements in the
area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic
laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of
international agreements shall prevail."' 5 It also prevents Turkish citizens from
accessing fundamental rights. Politically, Article 301 effects Turkey's global
reputation and impairs its relations with many countries, even its allies.
Finally, from a moral perspective, Article 301 prohibits progress. While
Article 301 did not stand out immediately when the Turkish legislature enacted
the new penal code, its far-reaching effects quickly became obvious when
notable Turkish journalists and writers began to face prosecution for speaking
out against sensitive topics, such as the Armenian Genocide and the denial of
civil rights to Turkish-Kurds.
Part IV examines how Article 301, through the limitations it places on
speech, contradicts the freedom of expression standards set forth by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Convention). 6 This Part discusses the origins of the Convention
and its relevant provisions that provide for freedom of expression. This Part
also discusses the European Court of Human Right's (ECHR) response to
Article 301, and Turkey's response to allegations that it is violating its
14 See BARBARA HARFF & TED ROBERT GuRR, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 47-48
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing how the Kurdish Worker's Party's use of terrorism to pursue an
independent Kurdish state created a backlash among Turkish nationalists).
15 TuRK. CONST. art. 90. On October 2, 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gil addressed
the Turkish Parliament at the opening ceremony of its new legislative year, and during his
speech, Gill said that the most pressing issue for the Republic is the drafting of a new
constitution. Mijmtaz~r Tiirk6ne, New Constitution, TODAY'S ZAMAN, Oct. 4,2008, http://www.
todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=154922. President GiIl expressed a desire to
see a new constitution that is" 'advanced' "and" 'provide[s] guarantees for fundamental rights
and freedoms and strongly reinforce[s] the democratic, secular and social state governed by
law.' " Id.
6 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 10 (discussing freedom
of expression).
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international legal obligations under the European Convention. Even though
restrictions on freedom of expression are sometimes permissible, the European
Convention prescribes strict requirements for when it is permissible to abridge
this right. 17 Turkey's inability to ensure that its laws are commensurate with
the standards set forth by the EU is important because Turkey is seeking
membership into the Union. 8 Regardless, some members of the justice system
and some Turkish nationalists believe that the underlying reason for enacting
Article 301, maintaining a unified identity, deserves more protection than
protecting the right to free expression. Furthermore, these individuals are
opposed to modifying these rules to achieve what could be a more
economically, socially, and politically desirable result: EU membership.
Part V discusses the current state of Article 301, focusing on the
international pressure to revise Article 301 and on the Turkish legislature's
actual plans for revision. Part VI questions whether there is a better alternative
that Turkey can utilize in trying to achieve its legitimate goals while ensuring
that the state is not sacrificing the individual rights of citizens. Part VII
ventures in the opposite direction and briefly questions whether the enactment
of Article 301 is the type of state action that is necessary in establishing a
democracy. The ultimate conclusion of this Note, however, is that Turkey
must abolish Article 301 and recognize the freedom of expression as necessary
in establishing a true democracy.
Since its inception in 2005, Article 301 has affected Turkey both internally
and externally. It has turned citizen against citizen and has hindered Turkey's
relations not only with the EU, but also with some of Turkey's allies.'9 The
17 See id art. 10, para. 2 (listing several instances "in a democratic society, in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety" when it is necessary to curtail the right);
see also Letter from the International PEN and the International Publishers Association to Prime
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Nov. 24, 2006), available at http://www.article 19.
org/pdfs/letters/turkey-penal-code.pdf.
I" See generally Turkey-Key Documents, European Commission, Enlargement, http://ec.euro
pa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key documents-en.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008)
(collecting EU documents relevant to Turkey's bid for accession).
19 On January 19, 2007, a teenage nationalist assassinated notable Turkish-Armenian
newspaper editor Hrant Dink. Dink angered many nationalists by speaking out about "the mass
killing of Armenians by Truks in the early [twentieth] century." Sarah Rainsford, Killing Sparks
'Turkishness 'Row, BBCNEwS, Feb. 9,2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/6343809.
stm. Ultranationalist extremists have committed similar crimes in an attempt to suppress
democratic ideals. See Sebnem Arsu, Suspects in Journalist's Killing Came From a Hotbed of
Turkish Ultranationalist Sentiment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at A1 2 (discussing the attempted
lynching of leftist protestors, the killings of two professors and a Catholic priest, and the
bombing of a McDonald's restaurant which was "chosen as a Western target").
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Article's effects on foreign relations focus on its failure to acknowledge the
Armenian Genocide and the resulting strain on the relationship between
Turkey and Armenia.2' Turkey should amend Article 301, even if the country
feels as though it "needs such a law."21 A wise man once said, "Peace can only
last where human rights are respected, where the people are fed, and where
individuals and nations are free., 22 Turkey's unbridled fear that inflammatory
statements against the government and polarizing criticism will fracture the
Turkish identity cannotjustify infringing on the exercise of fundamental rights.
II. BACKGROUND: TURKEY AND THE HISTORICAL IDEOLOGIES
BEHIND ARTICLE 301
In order to understand the rationale behind the enactment of Article 301,
one must understand the history of Turkey and the nature of the Turkish
identity. Turkey is a country with a rich history of disputes over territorial
boundaries and internal disputes between groups of Turkish citizens with
different ideologies that stem back to the fall of the Ottoman Empire.23
Whether it involves battling with its close neighbor, Greece, over territorial
disputes or regulating internal disputes between Turkish nationalists and the
group of citizens they consider outliers, the Turkish-Kurds, Turkey seems to
consistently be in a state of unrest.
When the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the fifteenth century, it was
one of the greatest empires the world would ever see, having expanded its rule
from the Caucasus to the Balkans to North Africa.24 However, during what
came to be referred to as the Period of Decline, from the second half of the
sixteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century, the Empire gradually
lost momentum. It was during this period that the rest of Europe began to
transform intellectually, economically, and technologically, while the Ottoman
Empire remained "oblivious."26 In an attempt to keep up with the changing
20 See Bruce Clark, Turkey's Armenian Dilemma, BBC NEWS, Fed. 27, 2007, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6386625.stm (discussing the history and psychology of Turkey's refusal
to recognize the Armenian Genocide).
2' Human Rights Watch, supra note 13.
22 The 14th Dalai Lama, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture (Dec. 11, 1989), available at http://nob
elprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1989/lama-lecture.html.
23 See Metin Heper, The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics, 54 J. INT'L AFF. 63, 63-68
(2000) (discussing the history of Turkey and its many internal political tension).
24 Heper, supra note 23, at 63.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 63-64.
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times, some Turkish citizens attempted to form the first public bureaucracy by
emulating their European counterparts. But the country's Islamist
traditionalists opposed these efforts.28 In 1923, the Turkish Republic was
founded, enabling the "Westernizing reformers [to gain] control over the
country. 29 After this paradigmatic shift in control, the country underwent
various periods of transformation that included the introduction of a multi-
party democracy and the "[substitution of] enlightened reasoning for Islamic
dogma."3
Even though the country has undergone numerous transformations,
including the acceptance of many Western ideals, "[c]ontinuity rather than
change characterizes Turkish political culture."'" Numerous political norms
that developed during the six centuries of the Ottoman Empire still affect
"contemporary Turkish politics. 3 2 In particular, the Ottoman Empire was
focused on "keeping the realm together.., and the maintenance of law and
order within the country."3 3 The Ottomans were constantly asking themselves
the critical question: "How can this state be maintained?"34 In light of this
question, "the Ottomans adopted a circular notion ofjustice" which was based
on finding rules that "contributed to the public welfare which in turn [would
provide] the state with the resources necessary to maintain power."35
According to the Ottomans, "the welfare of society depended upon the well-
being of the state. 36 But the Ottoman Empire's fatal flaw may have been its
over-emphasis on the state.37
The Ottoman Empire's overemphasis on the state proved to be too divisive
for the Empire to withstand. "From the 1880s onward, a group of young
(junior) Ottoman bureaucrats[, collectively known as Young Turks,] who had
been educated in the modern, European-style colleges," and who had become
27 Id. at 64.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3' Id. at 63.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 64.
34 Id. at 66.
35 Id.
36 Id.
31 See Erik Jan Ztlrcher, Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity
Politics 1908-1938, in OTrOMAN PAST AND TODAY'S TURKEY 150, 150 (Kemal H. Karpat
ed., 2000) ("All through the nineteenth century nationalism proved a debilitating virus for the
multinational Islamic state that was the Ottoman Empire.").
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dissatisfied with the "impotence of the government," overthrew an autocratic
sultan and established a constitutional, parliamentary regime.3" But according
to one scholar, "their espousal of constitutionalism clashed with their
elitism."39 To the elite, "the constitution was an instrument and an emblem of
modernity, but not a goal per se."'4 It was this kind of casual disregard for the
tenets of fundamental rights that has led to Turkey's current dilemma; as
Turkish history shows, when Turkish leaders have "faced a choice between
modernization and genuine democracy, they always opted for the former."''
The Young Turks "attributed primary significance to maintaining the unity of
the state and believed that the salvation of society resided in the welfare of the
state." ' 2 But unfortunately, "[t]his preoccupation with the significance and
welfare of the state led to the emergence of a center-periphery cleavage along
cultural lines." ' The cultural orientation of the ruling class differed from the
rest of the population." Consequently, the ruling class, with their burgeoning
familiarity with Western culture, began to perceive the general population as
unsophisticated. 5
Religion also contributed to the cultural divisions. Before the nineteenth
century, "despite the fact that the elite and commoners subscribed to different
versions of their religion, Islam had served as a vital link between them."
However, in the nineteenth century, many members of the elite secularized and
began to view "themselves as far superior to the [general] people. 47
A substantial consequence of the "center-periphery conflict in the Ottoman
Empire was that politico-cultural problems took precedence over socio-
economic issues in the agenda of the state."" For example, "the Ottoman elite
" Id. at 151. The Young Turks consisting "primarily of members of the bureaucratic and
military elites, carried on the political elitism of the Old and Young Ottomans." Heper, supra
note 23, at 67. They "dominated Ottoman politics from 1912 to 1918." Id.
" See Ztircher, supra note 37, at 151. "Their background as members of the administrative
elite and their adherence to positivism, with its fundamentally undemocratic attitudes and deep-
rooted mistrust of the masses, led them to see themselves as an enlightened elite on a mission
to educate their people." Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Heper, supra note 23, at 68.
43 Id. at 66.
44Id.
41 Id. at 67.
46 Id. at 66-67.
41 Id. at 67.
48 Id. at 68.
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had no interest in mercantilism and did not... use tariffs to collect revenue."49
The elite believed that "peace and prosperity depended on keeping the
members of each class in their respective places."5° Their antiquated belief in
the caste system as the key to prosperity "prevented the elite from
understanding the logic of a capitalist economy."'" In 1923, five years after the
Ottoman defeat in the First World War, the Turkish Republic was born.52
The founders of the new Turkish Republic were fearful that the Republic
would follow in the footsteps of its predecessor and be torn apart along the
primordial lines of religion, culture, and ideology at any moment.5 3 It is this
fear of division and an "over-emphasis on harmony" that has acted as a
"serious barrier to the emergence of adversarial politics in Republican
Turkey."5
4
How the Turkish state is defined has been one of the biggest challenges in
trying to maintain one national identity.55 Kemal Atattirk, the founder of
modern Turkey, formulated six principles representing a political program for
social change.56 Atatirk, whose achievements included leading the Turkish
national liberation struggle, putting an end to the Ottoman dynasty, and
creating the Republic of Turkey, was elected Turkey's first President in 1923."7
He sought to adopt the standards and practices of European nations and to
prohibit practices that would inhibit progress.58 Atatiirk believed that the
reforms that the Ottomans had implemented over the centuries were "too
concessionary as the Ottomans had sought to appease both traditionalists and
modernists."59 He also believed these reforms led to the failure of the Empire
and the "future of the republic depended on how it was able to... avoid the
mistakes of the past."6 In accordance with his beliefs, Atatfirk formed six
principles: secularism, nationalism, republicanism, populism, etatism, and
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See also Zircher, supra note 37, at 157.
" See Heper, supra note 23, at 68.
14 Id. at 69.
" Cf Marwan Bishara, A Voteon Turkey's Identity, INT'LHERALD TRIB., July21,2007, at6
(discussing how secularism, nationalism, and republicanism define Turkey in light of the 2007
election).
5" Sabri M. Akural, Kemalist Views on Social Change, in ATATURK AND THE MODERNIZATION
OF TURKEY 125, 125 (Jacob M. Landau ed., 1984) (listing the six principles).
" BiographyofAtatflrk, http://www.ataturk.conmcontent/view/24/43/(last visited Sept. 20,2008).
58 STEPHEN VERTIGANS, IsLAMIC ROOTS AND RESURGENCE IN TURKEY 42 (2003).
59 Id.
60 Id.
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revolutionism (reformism).6 While all six principles were worthy goals, three
of them, secularism, nationalism, and republicanism, emerged as the three
pillars that would define modem Turkey.6 2
"Secularism was the foundation stone on which all the other Kemalist
reforms, the reforms of Atatiirk and his disciples, were built."63 "Ataturk's
awareness of Islam's historical role" and his recognition that the ulema, the
body of Muslim clergy, could offer "potential communication channels for
dissident messages led him to conclude that religion could be an important
obstacle in the route to modernization."' Further, "[t]he absence of Islam, and
indeed religion generally, in recent Western achievements and its perceived
role in the Ottoman decline was confirmation for Atatilrk that it should not be
influential within a modem Turkish republic."6 Atattirk's beliefs about Islam
started a "trend of secularization interwoven with nationalism that was unique
to Turkey. 6 6 It was unique to Turkey because, typically, the Western process
of secularization involved separating church and state completely. 67 The
secular movement supports restrictions on religious practices in public and
advocates a strong separation between church and state. 68 However, according
to the Turkish idea of secularization, Islam was subjected to state control.69
For example, laws were passed that only permitted secular teaching in
compulsory elementary education.7" Finally, in an act driven by secularism,
reference to Islam as the official religion of Turkey was removed from the
Turkish constitution in 1928.71 The process of secularization was designed to
72put an end to hostility based on religion and to create a more unified country.
61 See Akural, supra note 56, at 125. See also Bishara, supra note 55.
62 See Bishara, supra note 55.
63 Akural, supra note 56, at 126.
64 VERTIGANS, supra note 58, at 42.
65 Id.
66 Id. In 1924, important theological institutions began to be abolished. Id.
67 Id.
68 See Bishara, supra note 55.
69 VERTIGANS, supra note 58, at 42.
0 Id. at 43. "As part of the new education, the ulema were 'impugned... for the decline
of the Ottoman Empire.' " Id. (omission in original) (quoting SERIF MARDIN, RELIGION AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN TURKEY 155 (1989)).
71 Id.
72 Cf Kemal Kiri§ci, Minority/Majority Discourse: The Case of the Kurds in Turkey, in
MAKING MAJORITIES: CONSTrrUTING THE NATION IN JAPAN, KOREA, CHINA, MALAYSIA, FIJI,
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES 227, 238 (Dru C. Gladney ed., 1998). The leaders of the
Turkish Republic did not see Islam as a unifying factor. Id.
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Nationalism is multifaceted in that Atatilrk envisioned not just the
"establishment and preservation of a national state with complete
independence conditioned by modem Turkish nationalism" but also a state that
was focused on a unified identity not based on religion or race.73 Quite simply,
nationalism refers to the common citizenship of all Turkish citizens regardless
of background because Atatcirk believed in a strict definition of the national
identity.74 "All citizens of Turkey [we]re Turks," and they were to join
together to form the building blocks of the nation that would unite to create the
national culture.75
Republicanism, the foundation of Kemalist ideology, is "comprise[d of] the
notions of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality before the law" and was
originally intended to combat the totalitarian tendencies of the fallen Ottoman
Empire.76 However, ironically, even though Atattirk conceived republicanism
as a democratic regime based on true representation of the popular will, "he
preferred the authoritarian political practice of the old system as a way of
reaching his goals. Consequently, liberalism and democracy were not a part
of the Kemalist principles."77
While Atatfirk intended for secularism, nationalism, and republicanism to
compliment each other, different political parties have adopted various forms
of these individual principles while refusing to incorporate all three as
intended.78 Additionally, while the Islamist AK Party (AKP), the current
ruling party, accepts the secularism and republicanism framework of the
constitution, the party has been accused by the opposition Republican Peoples
Party (CHP) of "compromising Turkish identity by its overtures to the
Kurds ... ."" Since the three pillars were supposed to facilitate the creation
of a unified national identity, it is no surprise that this multi-party regime has
garnered much criticism from journalists and the country's elite who felt that
a rational democracy was necessary. 0
" Mustafa Aydin, Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and
Traditional Inputs, in SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIc 171 (Sylvia Kedourie
ed., 1999).
74 See id. at 174.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 171.
77 HEINZ KRAMER, A CHANGING TURKEY 7 (2000).
78 Bishara, supra note 55.
79 Id. The CHP questioned the AKP's commitment to nationalism because it believes that
the AKP compromises the Turkish identity by attempting to enlist the support of Kurds who
comprise about a quarter of the population. Id.
80 See Metin Heper & Tanel Demirel, The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in
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The elite were divided over what type of democracy would best serve the
country.8 The "state elite"--Atatijrk, the intellectual-bureaucratic elite, and
military officers-defended the secular-democratic state and rational
democracy, which placed the long-term interests of the community over
narrow political interests.82 The other side of this political cadre was the
political elite, who championed the idea of a popular democracy and placed
narrow political interests ahead of the general public interest.8 3 In short, "[f]or
the state elite, the Republic came first and democracy second. For the political
elite, the reverse held true."84 The state elite won this political tug-of-war
between the country's leaders. According to one scholar, this was a mixed
blessing for Turkey because, despite the fact that the failure of the nation's
leaders to come to agreement resulted in several military interventions, the
country had not resorted back to an authoritarian regime. 5 This was because
the military leaders saw democracy as a means of facilitating rational
policymaking and not as a way of creating popular representation." So even
though pure democratic principles have not been fully integrated into Turkish
politics, Turkey is free from an "authoritarian one-party regime or a long-term
military dictatorship. 8 7
The current system of government could be considered a watered-down
form of democracy. For example, the Turkish constitution on its face grants
citizens such basic rights as the freedom of communication; freedom of
residence and movement; freedom of conscience, religious belief, and
conviction; freedom of thought and opinion and the right to disseminate one's
thoughts and opinions." The Turkish constitution also grants the press the
right to be free from censorship.89
However, even though the Turkish constitution grants citizens many rights,
the original text of the constitution enacted under the military regime of 1980
Turkey, in TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS 109, 110 (Sylvia Kedourie ed., 1998).
81 See Heper, supra note 23, at 72-73 (discussing the "bifurcation of the elite").
82 Id.
83 Id. at 73.
8 Id. Although no precise definition can be accorded to the term "rational democracy," the
state elite's victory meant that a "more rationally functioning democracy" would be installed.
Cf Metin Heper, Conclusion: The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in
Turkey, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY 138, 140 (Barry Rubin & Metin Heper eds., 2002).
85 See Heper, supra note 23, at 74.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 TURK. CONST. arts. 22-26.
89 Id. art. 28.
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to 1983 placed "severe restrictions on the actual exercise of these rights."9°
The preamble of the Turkish constitution originally stated: "[N]o protection
shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests,
the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its State and
territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles,
reforms and modernism of Atatfrk.... .""
Furthermore, Articles 13 and 14 allow fundamental rights to be abridged,
more specifically the right to freedom of speech, when necessary.92 Article 13,
originally stated:
Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in
conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the
aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its
territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national
security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public
morals and public health.. .
Similarly, Article 14 stated:
None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution
shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible
integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering
the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying
fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of
the State under the control of an individual or a group, or
establishing the hegemony of one social class over the others, or
creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or
90 William Hale, Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process,
in TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: DOMESTIC POLITICS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS 107, 110 (Ali (arkoklu & Barry Rubin eds., 2003).
91 TURK. CONST. pmbl. (1982) (amended 2004). On March 26, 2002, Parliament passed a
package of statute reforms that included amending the preamble to remove the provision that
"merely having 'thoughts or opinions' deemed contrary to Turkey's national interests could be
deemed illegal, but the substitution of 'actions' did not remove the objection that the restriction
as a whole was dangerously vague and catch-all." Hale, supra note 90, at 114-15.
92 See Hale, supra note 90, at 110 ("[T]he original texts of Articles 13 and 14 placed severe
restrictions on the freedom of expression.").
9' Id. at 110-1 1 (emphasis added) (quoting TURK. CONST. art. 13 (1982) (amended 2001)).
[Vol. 37:181
TURKEY'S ARTICLE 301
sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of
government based on these concepts and ideas.94
Article 14 aims to prevent the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms. But
while prevention of abuse is ajustifiable reason for placing restrictions on the
exercise of speech, the restrictions placed on the right to exercise one's rights
and freedoms in the Turkish constitution are considerably broader than in other
states in the European Union.
For example, the Romanian constitution contains a clause that stipulates
when certain rights and freedoms can be restrained. Article 53(1) states:
The exercise of certain rights or freedoms may only be restricted
by law, and only if necessary, as the case may be, for: the defence
of national security, of public order, health, or morals, of the
citizens' rights and freedoms; conducting a criminal
investigation; preventing the consequences of a natural calamity,
disaster, or an extremely severe catastrophe.95
Most notably, the Romanian constitution qualifies these restrictions as
applying "only if necessary."96 The Romanian constitution also stipulates that
any restrictions placed on freedoms "shall be proportional to the situation
having caused it, applied without discrimination, and without infringing on the
existence of such right or freedom."9 7 What sets these clauses apart from
Article 14 of the Turkish constitution is that Romania has clearly stated that
proportionality and necessity will be important factors in the applicability of
restrictions on any freedoms listed in the Romanian constitution. In contrast,
Turkey has not placed any constitutional checks on the government's power
to restrict freedoms,9" and this deficiency in the Turkish constitution has
manifested itself in the vicious prosecutions that have taken place under
Article 301.
As mentioned before, the emphasis that is placed on maintaining "one
national identity" is also a driving force behind the enactment of Article 301 "
9' Id. at 111 (quoting TURK. CONST. art. 14 (1982) (amended 2001)).
91 ROM. CONST. art. 53(1).
96 Id.
97 Id. art. 53(2).
98 See TURK. CONST. art. 14 (1982) (amended 2001).
" See supra text accompanying note 55. "Turkey claims that all Turkish citizens are treated
equally, but its unwillingness to acknowledge minority differences results in de facto unequal
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One ethnic group in particular, the Kurds, represent up to an estimated one-
fifth of the country's population,'00 but as a consequence of the traditional
emphasis on one Turkish national identity, they have faced restrictions on their
language, culture, and freedom of expression.'0 ' "Ethnicity was an alien
concept to the Ottoman's," and the only "line of demarcation" recognized in
the empire was between Muslims and non-Muslims." 2 Therefore, the
Republic adopted civic nationalism to structure its national identity and began
to use word "Turk" to describe those who pledged loyalty to Turkey; Turk was
not meant to refer to ethnic or religious groups.
0 3
After many decades of political, cultural, and socio-economic strife, Turkey
is still having trouble shifting from a government focused on the long-term
interests of the community to one focused on reconciling the state, group, and
individual interests." The state and political elite, mentioned above, continue
to stand on opposite sides, and they are unwilling to fix the political instability
that their conflicting views have caused.0 5 Consequently, democracy in
Turkey is not fully developed,'0 6 which is likely why undemocratic rules such
as Article 301 have been able to remain in force even under harsh criticism.
But "[t]he recent designation of Turkey as a candidate for full membership in
the European Union [has] provided new impetus for Turkey to democratize
further."'0 7 Turkey cannot accede to the EU unless it fully complies with all
of the EU's demands, which include ensuring that Turkey complies with EU
standards for human rights.'08 At one point in time, the EU stated that it would
treatment under the law." FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 825 (Arch Puddington et
al. eds., 2007).
100 Watts, supra note 12, at 129.
'0' See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 99.
'02 See Heper, supra note 23, at 75.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 81-82.
105 See id. (positing that "state and political elite could adopt polar views and cause political
instability").
106 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
107 Heper, supra note 23, at 82. Heper states, "although the Ottoman legacy continues to
influence Turkey's political culture and practice, the overall direction is toward greater
democracy and enhanced responsiveness of the government to the wishes and demands of the
population at large, not only the ruling elites." Id.
' See Hale, supra note 90, at 107-08 (noting that the EU's conditions included reform in
expression rights, treatment of minorities, the death penalty, torture, prison conditions, rights of
civil associations, and the operation of the judiciary). Hale notes that "as the European Union's
program for enlargement into Eastern Europe got off the ground, respect for human rights was
made a sine qua non for candidate countries." Id. at 108. Furthermore at its meeting in 1993,
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refuse to enter into accession negotiations with Turkey without evidence that
Turkey had met the "political criteria" for membership. "09
In conclusion, the Ottoman Empire and the various political parties and
ideologies that have emerged since the Empire's fall have molded Turkey and
its current political state. The country's leaders and steadfast nationalists have
decided that the best way to maintain one national identity in the presence of
so many different ideologies and ethnicities is to stifle dissidents and prohibit
any insults against the Turkish culture. Article 301 was born out of this desire
to protect the Turkish culture.
III. ARTICLE 301 IS ENACTED
In October 2004, a new penal code was enacted to replace the outdated
code, 10 which had been in effect since 1926.11 Many Turkish citizens
welcomed the new penal code, thinking that it would bring more protection for
individual rights and freedoms." 2 This was not simply wishful thinking given
that the constitution had been amended only months early in May of 2004 to
say: "Should the international treaties on the fundamental rights and
freedoms... and national laws contain contradictory stipulations on the same
subject, the provisions of international law would prevail."" 3 However, the
Turkish legislature had other ideas. They included Article 301 in the new
penal code " 'as [a] secret gun[ ] ...not displayed to the international
community but nicely kept in a drawer, ready for action in case [the
government] decided to hit someone in the head.' " " Consequently, instead
of bringing the progress and the freedoms that the Turkish citizens hoped for,
the new penal code imposed more limitations on basic human rights.
the European Council affirmed that " 'membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities.' " Id. (quoting Copenhagen European Council,
Presidency Conclusions (June 21-22, 1993)).
'09 Id. at 108.
"0 Baskin Oran, The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty
and Current Issues, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 35, 54 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007).
. Yasemin Celik Levin, The Effect of CEDA W on Women's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TURKEY 202, 210 (Zehra F. Kabasakl Arat ed., 2007).
12 Id.; cf Oran, supra note 110, at 54.
113 Oran, supra note 110, at 54.
14 CAMILLE OVERSON HENSLER & MARK MOLLER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF
AsSOcIATION IN TURKEY 47 (2005) (quoting Orhan Pamuk).
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Articles 300-302, which adopt Articles 145, 158, and 159 of the 1926 penal
code respectively, were incepted to "suppress 'insults' to the President of the
Republic, the Turkish flag and symbol, the national anthem, the Turkish
national identity, the republic or the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish
government and the judicial organs or military and security organs.""' 5
Offenses are punishable by sentences ranging from two to four years of
imprisonment, and the sentences are subject to an increase by one-third if they
are committed by a Turkish citizen while he or she is abroad or if a member of
the media insults the President.1 6 The harsh sentences do not fit the crime, and
their enforcement has brought the Turkish Penal Code under intense scrutiny.
Other countries have similar provisions, but unlike Turkey, they have declined
to enforce them." 7
Turkey, in contrast, has prosecuted noted journalists and novelists for
violations of Article 301. l1' "Nationalists" have assisted in increasing the
number of individuals prosecuted by "[taking] it upon themselves to alert the
prosecutor about speeches and newspapers that 'denigrate[ ] Turkishness,' and
[by calling] for the prosecution of the perpetrators.""' 9 Once a "call for
prosecution," also known as suV duyurusu, is made, prosecutors and judges act
on it as though they are obliged to do so even though Article 301 contains no
express provision that requires prosecution for possible violators.1 21
One of the most striking cases was the prosecution of noted novelist
and 2006 Nobel laureate, Orhan Pamuk, who was tried after he mentioned the
Armenian Genocide committed by Ottoman Turks.' 2' Even though the charges
were dropped in early 2006, the case brought Turkey's Article 301 to
international attention, and at that point, "the damage to Turkey's reputation
had been done."' 122 A less well-known case, but one that demonstrates the fact
115 Id. at46.
116 Id.
..7 Id. France has laws against insulting the President and laws prohibiting defamation or
insulting of governmental administrative bodies. Id. However, the last recorded instance of this
law's enforcement was in the mid 1960s. Id. Hensler and MUller note, "Such protectionist
legislation which is still in use is more associated with repressive regimes of the past rather than
modem democracies." Id.
1' See id. (discussing cases). See, e.g., Howard Chua-Eoan, Orhan Pamuk, TIME,
Apr. 30, 2006, at 111, 111 (listing Pamuk as one of the one hundred people who shape the world
and discussing his trial for insulting Turkishness).
9ran, supra note 111, at 55.
120 Id. It is unclear whether this process has continued after the 2008 amendment to Article 301.
2 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 51.
122 Id.
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that the Turkish justice system is eager to prosecute at the urging of
nationalists, is the case ofPerihan Magden she was ajournalist and author who
was tried for" 'turning people against military service' "through an article she
wrote entitled Conscientious Objection Is a Human Right.123
"[U]ltranationalists were allowed to loudly demonstrate outside the courtroom
throughout hearing" and "[c]ritics claim the fact that security forces did little
to quell the protestors makes them complicit.' ' 24 At her hearing, Magden said
she could not believe that she was in court and that she had to defend herself
for writing an article that "defended conscientious objection as a human right
and a right that is recognized by the [United Nations] and other countries." '125
Article 301 makes it not only a crime to express oneself, but the Article also
makes it a crime for individuals to propagate the expression of others. 26
Consequently, many publishers have also been prosecuted under Article 301.27
Fatih Ta§, a twenty-six-year-old student of communications and journalism at
Istanbul University and the owner of Aram publishing house, was prosecuted
and later acquitted for publishing a Turkish translation of a book by American
academic John Tirman, The Spoils of War: the Human Cost ofAmerica's Arms
Trade. 28 The book alleged that the Turkish military committed numerous
human rights abuses against a large part of the Kurdish population.2 9 Ta
argued that the book was not intended to insult Turkey or "Turkishness," but
the prosecutor demanded that Ta§ be tried for each "insult" in the book as a
separate charge. 3 Other publishers have been prosecuted for publishing
books that "denigrat[ed] the state and the republic" under Article 301 and for
"insulting Ataturk's memory. ' In a countrywhere itcanbe a crime to even
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Turkish Writer in Call-Up Trial, BBC.coM, June 7,2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu
rope/5054732.stm. The Turkish constitution states that where a national law conflicts with an
international treaty or law regarding fundamental rights, the international law will stand, TURK
CONST. art. 90; however, cases like those brought against Magdan demonstrate that this
provision is consistently ignored.
126 See TORK CEZA KANUNu [TURKISH PENAL CODE] art. 301 (2005) (amended 2008).
27 See Amnesty Int'l, Turkey: Article 301: How the Law on "Denigrating Turkishness" is an
Insult to Free Expression 5 (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/
003/2006/en/dom-EUR440032006en.pdf(discussing cases in which publishers were prosecuted
under Article 301 for the articles printed in their publication).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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portray Turkish people in a "bad light,"132j ournalists, publishers, and novelists
alike are very limited as to what they can put down on paper for fear that they
too may find themselves in court defending their right to freely express
themselves.
However, while many of these journalists, publishers, and novelists have
faced jail time and ostracism within the Turkish society, none have paid the
high price that Hrant Dink, editor of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian
newspaper Agos and a well-known public figure in Turkey, had to pay for his
writing a book about the Armenian Genocide of 1915.133 In 2005, shortly after
Article 301 was passed, Dink was charged with insulting "Turkishness. 134 It
is well-known that Turkey continues to deny that the systematic killing of
Armenians during the final years of the Ottoman Empire was genocide, while
it punishes those who recognize the event as genocide.135 Dink also wrote
about democratization and human rights in Turkey, issues that made him a
target for prosecution and the recipient of numerous threats from nationalists,
who viewed him as a traitor and called for his emigration.1 36
In 2006, Dink was prosecuted for the third time on charges of "denigrating
Turkishness., 13  Prior to this trial, Dink had been issued a six-month
suspended prison sentence following an October 2005 conviction on other
charges of "denigrating Turkishness" after a Turkish court ruled that one of his
articles had described Turkish blood as "dirty."' 3' Following this conviction
and a failed appeal attempt, Dink expressed his desire to leave Turkey in
a 2005 interview with the Associated Press: " 'I don't think I could live with
132 Id.
133 US.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Europe of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 33 (2007) (statement of Daniel Fried,
Assistant Sec'y for European and Eurasian Affairs); Obituary: Hrant Dink, BBCNEws,
Jan. 19, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6279907.stm.
'34 See Obituary: Hrant Dink, supra note 133.
'31 See Letter from Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec'y of Defense & Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y
of State to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 7,2007), reprinted
in Rice and Gates Lecture Pelosi on the Harms of the Genocide Resolution ARMENIAN WEEKLY,
Mar. 17, 2007 available at http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly/pol03170702.htm. In a
letter to the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, Secretary of
State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates expressed their hopes that Turkey would come to
terms with its history and recognize the genocide. Id.
'36 Press Release, Amnesty International USA, Amnesty International Condemns Murder of
Hrant Dink (Jan. 19,2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang--e&id=ENGUSA2
0070119001.
137 See Press Release, supra note 136.
138 See Obituary: Hrant Dink, supra note 133.
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an identity of having insulted them [Turks] in this country... if I am unable
to come up with a positive result, it will be honourable for me to leave this
country.' ""' However, before he could leave, a young Turkish nationalist
killed Dink in a" 'horrifying assassination [that] silence[d] one of Turkey's
bravest human rights defenders.' ,,"4" More than one-hundred thousand Turks
of a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds took to the streets of Istanbul to protest
Dink's murder, shouting, "We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians."'' 4
The trial and assassination of Dink focused the world's attention on Turkey
and made Dink a martyr for "all supporters of freedom of expression."'142 The
death ofDink shocked citizens, national human rights organizations, and allies
of Turkey alike, but the promise of change has remained just that-a promise.
Even though Prime Minister Erdogan stated on January 19, 2008 that Turkey
will" 'steadfastly continue along the path toward fully realizing freedom of
expression,' ,143 he has been known to successfully charge artists for depicting
him as an animal.'" "With this level of hypocrisy, it remains to be seen
whether continuing pressure and international exposure from the increasing
number of cases will eventually force the government into acting on its
declared commitment to freedom of expression. 1 45 The hypocrisy displayed
by Prime Minister Erdogan threatens Turkey's already imperiled international
reputation and promises to close the door to Turkey's hope of EU membership.
IV. ARTICLE 301 CONFLICTS WITH TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
A. Areas of Conflict
In December 1999, the EU's Helsinki summit recognized Turkey as an
official candidate for accession.'46 As with any other candidate country,
Turkey is required to address the political reforms that apply to all candidate
139 id.
"4 Press Release, supra note 136 (quoting Maureen Greenwood-Basken, Amnesty Int'l USA
Advocacy Director for Europe and Central Asia).
4 See Letter from Gates & Rice, supra note 135.
142 See id.
143 Id. (quoting Prime Minister Erdogan).
'44 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 51.
145 Id.
"4 Hale, supra note 90, at 108.
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countries.'47 Even before Article 301's enactment, Turkey had been ordered
to focus on four crucial areas of human rights reform that were specifically
problematic and that needed to be addressed in preparation for accession. One
such area of concern involved the infringement of: "freedom of expression and
association and of political parties."'48 However, it is evident that Article 301
directly impedes the right to free expression. This is important because a
judicial body of the EU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), is
committed to protecting freedom of expression rights set out by the
Convention.'49 Turkey is answerable to the ECHR both by virtue of the fact
that Turkey is a signatory to the Convention and through its bid for
membership into the EU, where "respect for human rights was made a sine qua
non for candidate countries."'"5 Consequently, Turkey must do everything in
its power to make sure it complies with its international obligations regarding
human rights. This Part discusses the background of the Convention and the
relevant provisions concerning freedom of expression. It also discusses
relevantjudgments handed down from Turkey's highest court and heard before
the ECHR, wherein the ECHR defined the extent to which Turkey can abridge
freedom of expression. Even though Turkey is fully aware of its international
obligations, it continues to abridge freedom of expression in an almost defiant
manner.
B. Historical Background of The European Convention on Human Rights
In 1950, the European Council created and adopted the Convention. 5' Its
official title is "The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms."'52  It opened for signature in Rome on
November 4, 1950 and took effect September 1953.' The European Council
used the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the framework for the
Convention, setting out to create a convention that would facilitate "collective
enforcement of certain ... rights set out in the Universal Declaration."' 54
147 Id.
148 Id. at 107.
149 See European Convention of Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 10. See generally
European Court of Human Rights, The Court, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+
Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
150 Hale, supra note 90, at 108.
.. European Court of Human Rights, supra note 149, para. 1.
152 Id.
153 Id.
,14 Id. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
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However, once the Convention was created, the Council realized it needed
to create judicial bodies to enforce it. The Council created three institutions:
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, created in 1951; the
European Commission on Human Rights, created in 1954; and the ECHR,
created in 1959. 155 The Council created the ECHR to be the main instrument
for enforcing human rights, and "[w]here states accepted the right of individual
application to the Court by their citizens (which Turkey has done since 1991)
the Convention became internationally justiciable."' 6
In its original version, the Convention made the right of individual
application voluntary, and individual application could only be exercised
against those member states that had accepted the right.157 However, Protocol
No. 11 to the Convention subsequently made the acceptance of the right of
individual application compulsory, and member states no longer have the
freedom to choose whether they will be held accountable to the ECHR for
violations.
Another change combined the ECHR and the Commission. The ECHR and
the Commission had a heavy caseload and it was difficult for the ECHR to
keep up its supervisory role over those states that chose not to submit to
individual application. 58 Before Protocol No. 11, states had to file a complaint
with the Commission, which would determine the admissibility of the
complaint. 159 The Commission would then offer to help the parties come to a
peaceful resolution. 60 If no resolution could be reached, then a report
detailing the facts and expressing an opinion on the merits of the case was
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. 6' Once the report had been
transmitted, the complaining state could bring its case before the court, but
individuals could not bring their cases before the court.'62 Caseload statistics
seem to demonstrate that this system was not the most efficient; thus, the
Convention was reformed to simplify the structure of the court and to unify the
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1stplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
... Council of Europe, About the Committee ofMinisters, http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM_
en.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2008). European Court of Human Rights, supra note 149, para. 2.
156 See Hale, supra note 90, at 108. See also European Court of Human Rights, supra
note 149, para. 3.
.57 European Court of Human Rights, supra note 149, para. 3.
158 Id. para. 6.
159 Id. para. 3.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. para. 4.
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ECHR and the Commission into a single, full-time court where individual
application to the court would be compulsory.163
However, the Council found that there was an even more efficient way to
guarantee that individual rights were vindicated. As the European Union
began a campaign for enlargement in Eastern Europe, "respect for human
rights was made a sine qua non for candidate countries. ' ' "M Consequently, the
European Council made it clear that countries seeking membership into the EU
would have to create "institutions [within their own state] guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities." '65  Thus, under this new policy, countries falling under the
auspices of the Convention must create certain institutions for guaranteeing
rights helping to ensure that the ECHR does not get overburdened by petitions
claiming human rights violations. 66
C. Freedom of Expression Rights in the European Convention on Human
Rights
The Convention, the first regional human rights treaty, regulates freedom
of expression for countries that are signatories to the treaty.167 Article 10,
paragraph 1 of the Convention states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers."'68 However, these rights are not absolute.
The second part of Article 10 states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
163 Id. para. 6.
16 See Hale, supra note 90, at 108.
165 Id.
166 Cf id.
167 Amaya .Jbeda de Torres, Freedom of Expression Under the European Convention on
Human Rights: A Comparison With the Inter-American System of Protection of Human
Rights, 10 No. 2 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 6, 6 (2003); see also European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 10, art. 10.
161 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 10, para. 1.
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of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.'69
Under the Convention, a country cannot abridge that right without
demonstrating that the speech falls within one of the expressions of
Section 2.70 Both the ECHR and the former Commission consistently
interpreted the freedom of expression rights guaranteed by the Convention as
being" 'one of the basic conditions for [the] progress [of a democratic society]
and for the development of every man.' "17
In Handyside v. United Kingdom, a publisher was penalized for a
publication that, according to the United Kingdom, interfered with the
"protection of morals" in society. 72 The publisher complained that the United
Kingdom imposed the restrictions to "muzzle a small-scale publisher whose
political leanings met with the disapproval of a fragment of public opinion."'173
The ECHR stated that "[f]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its
progress and for the development of every man.' 74 The protections of
Article 10 thereby extend "not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference,
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population.' ' I7  Because morals are derived from unique characteristics like
time and place, the court recognized state authorities are often in the better
position to determine when public morals need to be protected.1 76 However,
the court noted that its duty was to give the utmost protection to freedom of
expression because of its importance in a democratic society. 77 The court
169 Id. art. 10, para. 2.
17' Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1976) (finding that
interferences with the right of freedom of expression by public authorities "entail a 'violation'
of Article 10 if they do not fall within one of the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2").
171 Ubeda de Torres, supra note 167, at 6 (alteration in original) (citing Handyside, 24 Eur.
Ct. H.R., 23, para. 49).
172 Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 24.
... Id. at 25.
174 Id. at 23.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 22.
171 See id. at 23 (noting that the court's "supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost
attention to the principles characterising a 'democratic society' ").
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found that this interpretation of the rights guaranteed under Article 10 is the
only way to ensure the "pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without
which there is no 'democratic society.' ,178
This case shows that the ECHR seeks to grant individuals the freedom to
express themselves as long as that expression does not interfere with the
general welfare. While the ECHR and the Convention are separate entities
from the EU, 179 members of the EU are expected to abide by the terms of the
Convention.' The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states:
(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community Law.
(3) The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member
States.''
These provisions of the TEU show that "the European Union has a very clear
position on membership: democracy is a must.' 8 2 If a member state violates
human rights in a "serious and persistent" way, it can lose its rights under the
treaty. 183
Even if Turkey was not actively seeking EU membership, as one of the
Convention's original signatories, it is obligated to further the goals of the
Convention. 8 4 Despite its obligations, Turkey has failed to conform to the
178 Id. The European Court further ruled that it would require States to present, for the
court's review, evidence and arguments so that it could "decide... whether the reasons given
by national authorities to justify the actual measures of 'interference' . . . are relevant and
sufficient under Article 10 § 2." Id. at 23-24.
179 See MICHAEL T. ARNHEIM, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN ACCESSIBLE
APPROACH TO THE ISSUES AND PRINCIPLES 2 (2005) (explaining that the ECHR was established
to "operate the Convention").
IS' Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (Philip
Alston et al. eds., 1999).
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J.
(C 325) 5, 13 [hereinafter TEU].
182 See Meltem MiOfiUler-Bac, The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union, in
TURKEY BEFORE AND AFTER ATATURK: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 240, 244 (Sylvia
Kedourie ed., 1999) (discussing the TEU among other agreements).
183 See Alston & Weiler, supra note 180, at 6 (internal citations omitted).
8 Cf Watts, supra note 12, at 132 (discussing Turkey's role as signatory to the Convention).
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Convention even in light of direct orders from the ECHR and the enticement
of EU membership in exchange for human rights reform.
D. The European Court of Human Rights' Response To Turkey's Restriction
of the Freedom of Expression
The ECHR has already clearly defined the limitations that can be placed on
freedom of expression." 5 Several decisions make it clear that the government
must be able to tolerate criticism." 6 Since Turkey's laws against freedom of
expression clearly contradict the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention,
prosecutions by the Turkish high court under Article 301 have not been able
to find favor in the ECHR.
In several cases, the ECHR has issued judgments specifically relating to
freedom of expression in Turkey.'87 The court was guided by the following
principle: "[A] state may only restrict free expression under Article 10(2)
where it can demonstrate 'a pressing social need which would justify the
finding that the interference complained of was "proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued." ' " 8 Using this standard, the court found that
Article 10 had been violated in two recent cases, but found that the restrictions
at issue were permissible under Article 10(2) in a third. 9
In the 1998 case of Incal v. Turkey, Turkey convicted Ibrahim Incal, a
Turkish national and lawyer, for publishing a leaflet that military officials
believed contained separatist propaganda "capable of inciting the people to
resist the government and commit criminal offences."'"g The leaflet criticized
"the measures taken by the local authorities, in particular against small-scale
illegal trading and the sprawl of squatters' camps around the city."'19 1 The
court rejected Turkey's argument that the pamphlets were "intended to foment
an insurrection by one ethnic group against the State authorities" and that the
suppression of terrorism was a "pressing social need" sufficient to justify
"I5 See Ozgur Gtindem v. Turkey, 2000-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,25 (summarizing principles used
to examine if measures are "necessary in a democratic society").
1"6 See, e.g., id. at 26 (finding that authorities of a democratic state must tolerate of criticism,
even when that criticism is provocative or insulting); see also Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. A) at 23 ("The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government
than in relation to a private citizen.").
187 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY: VIOLATIONS OFFREE EXPRESSION IN TURKEY 18 (1999).
.8. Id. (quoting Incal v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1547, 1568).
189 See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 187, at 18.
'9o See Incal, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1554.
... Id. at 1552-54 (reproducing the entire pamphlet in question).
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interference with Incal's Article 10 rights."'9 2 The ECHR "did not discern
anything in the leaflet which might be regarded as incitement of part of the
population to violence, hostility or hatred between citizens."'
193
In 1998, the court found, in Socialist Party v. Turkey, that Turkey had
violated Article 11, which protects the right to freely associate. 9 Even though
this case ultimately turned on the right to freedom of association, the court
closely aligned Article 10's freedom of expression protections to the rights
guaranteed in Article 1 L The Constitutional Court of Turkey
(Constitutional Court) argued that the former head of the Socialist Party had
advocated for the "[creation] of minorities" within Turkey and for the
establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish federation, both undertakings which
directly contradict Turkey's efforts to build one unified nation where all
citizens are "Turks."' 96 The ECHR found that "the dissolution of the [Socialist
Party] was disproportionate to the aim pursued and ...unnecessary in a
democratic society"' 97 and the statements, "though critical and full of demands,
did not appear to it to call into question the need for compliance with
democratic principles and rules."' 9 '
In Zana v. Turkey, the ECHR held that Turkey had not violated Article 10
of the Convention'99 This case involved Mehdi Zana, a former mayor of
Diyarbakir, Turkey.2 °° Mr. Zana had publicly expressed his support for the
Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK) liberation movement,2 ' an organization
considered a terrorist organization by many.20 2 This statement was troubling
because security forces and PKK members had clashed in southeast Turkey,
claiming the lives of 4,036 civilians and 3,884 security force members.0 3 The
court agreed with the European Commission of Human Rights, which
192 Id. at 1568.
193 Id. at 1573. The ECHR also found it important that "a civilian who had to appear before
a court composed, even if only in part, of members of the armed forces" had legitimate cause to
fear the impartiality and independence of the court. Id.
'94 Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 1998-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233.
191 Id. at 1255 ("Article 11 must also be considered in light of Article 10.").
196 Id. at 1245.
197 Id. at 1259.
198 Id. at 1258.
'99 Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533.
200 Id. at 2539.
201 Id. at 2540 (" 'I support the PKK national liberation movement...'").
202 OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERRORISM (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1059
04.pdf.
203 Zana, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2539.
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concluded that "such a statement from a person with some political
standing... could reasonably lead the national authorities to fear a stepping
up of terrorist activities in the country. The authorities had therefore been
entitled to consider that there was a threat to national security and public
safety... ."204
In light of his political clout and the fact that Zana's support of the PKK
coincided with the murders of civilians by PKK militants, the court held that
Turkey's actions "pursued legitimate aims under Article 10 § 2.,,205 The court
recognized that freedom of expression "constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, 2 6 but this freedom is subject to "a
democratic society's legitimate right to protect itself against the activities of
terrorist organizations., 20
7
These cases demonstrate that the ECHR has already set parameters for
allowing Turkey to abridge the freedom of expression rights of its citizens.
The ECHR followed the Zana precedent most recently in 2000. On
July 18, 2000, the court held by a 6-1 vote that Turkey had violated Pelin
Sener's right to a fair trial and her right to freedom of expression under
Articles 6, section 1 and Article 10 respectively.20 8 Sener, a Turkish national
209living in Germany, was the owner and editor of a weekly review entitled
Haberde Yorumda Gerqek (The Truth of News and Comments) and published
in Istanbul. 211 "On September 5[,] 1993[,] the Istanbul State Security Court
ordered the seizure of the twenty-third edition of the review" on the grounds
that the article contained separatist propaganda."1'
During the proceedings before the State Security Court, Sener denied the
charges and argued that the offense that she was charged with violated her
right to freedom of expression in contravention of both the Turkish
constitution and Article 10 of the Convention.212 Ignoring the reference to the
Convention and the Turkish constitution, a panel of three judges found the
applicant guilty and sentenced her to six months in prison and a fine of fifty-
204 Id. at 2546-47.
205 Id. at 2547.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 2548.
208 See Sener v. Turkey, (unreported decision), http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc (follow
"HUDOC Database" hyperlink, then search for "26680/95" in the "Application Number" field).
209 Id. para. 64.
210 Id. para. 6.
211 Id. para. 7.
212 Id. para. 9.
2008]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
million Turkish liras ($79.50 at time of decision).21 According to the ECHR,
the State Security Court reasoned:
[Sener's] impugned article had referred to a certain part of
Turkish territory as "Kurdistan," had asserted that people living
there were Kurdish citizens, that the Kurdish nation wanted to be
exterminated, that genocide had taken place, that the territory
defined as "Kurdistan" had been bombed and burned and that
chemical weapons had been used. On these grounds, the court
found that the article, as a whole, disseminated propaganda
against the indivisibility of the State.214
This decision was subsequently appealed in Turkey before reaching the
ECHR.215
The European Commission on Human Rights opined that the measures
taken against Sener--"an intellectual whose statements contained sharp
criticism of the policy and action of Turkey[-]amounted to a kind of
censorship, which was likely to discourage others from publishing similar
opinions in the future. 216 It concluded that while states may contravene
Article 10 rights when doing so would be "necessary in a democratic society"
for "pursuing a legitimate aim," this power is still subject to limitations, and
"the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly." 27 The court
pointed to the fact that limits of permissible criticism by citizens are wider
when directed at the government. 218 The court found that as long as the press
does not interfere with the protection of "vital State interests," it is the job of
the press to inform the public about vital information that it has the right to
receive."'
The aforementioned cases show that the ECHR is committed to enforcing
the freedom of expression standards set forth in the Convention within the full
213 Id. para. 10.
214 Id. para. 11.
215 Seeid. paras. 4, 12-15.
216 Id. para. 38.
217 Id. para. 39. The court explained that the "Contracting States have a certain margin of
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European
supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by
an independent court." Id.
218 Id. para. 40.
29 Id. para. 41 ("[I]t is nevertheless incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas
on political issues, including divisive ones.").
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spirit of the law. Turkey is expected to abide by these standards; 220 however,
to this day, it has not.
Turkey's non-compliance with ECHR decisions is an issue that has plagued
the ECHR and other members of the European community for some time. For
example, in 2001, Georges Clerfayt, a member of the House of Representatives
of the Council of Europe, asked, "What urgent action [does] the Committee [of
Ministers] intend[ ] to take to ensure that Turkey changes its relevant
legislation without further delay so as [to] comply with the [ECHR]
judgments"? 22I Even though this comment came in response to legislation
involving other human rights abuses, it nevertheless highlights that non-
compliance with ECHR decisions has been a persistent problem.222 The ECHR
and European Community's only recourse is to threaten to deny Turkey's EU
membership application unless it amends its laws to conform to the ECHR's
standards.
E. Turkey's Stance on Article 301 as a Violation of Its International Legal
Obligations
Turkey is well aware of its international legal obligations, but it has sought
to circumvent the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention by arguing that
the restrictions on freedom of expression fall into an exception of the
Convention for the protection of the "unity of the Turkish nation and the
territorial integrity of the state." '23 The exception to the freedom of expression
rights carved out by the Convention, says: "The exercise of these freedoms...
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests
of... territorial integrity or... for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others." '24 On a few occasions, Turkey has attempted to use this exception to
justify its abrogation of human rights.
Such was the case in Socialist Party, decided in 1998, when the
Constitutional Court had to answer to the ECHR for ordering the closure of the
Socialist Party.225 While protecting territorial integrity is a protected practice
220 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
22 Eur. Parl. Ass., Reply from the Comm. of Ministers, 112th Sess., Doc. No. 9327 (2002).
222 Id.
223 Cf Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233, 1245; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 187, at 19.
224 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 10(2).
225 Socialist Party, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1233. See also discussion supra Part IV.D.
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in the Convention, the ECHR construes this clause very narrowly.226
Consequently, in Socialist Party, the ECHR rejected the territorial argument
and the argument for the promotion of a unified nation.227 It found that "the
dissolution of the [Socialist Party] was disproportionate to the aim pursued and
consequently unnecessary in a democratic society. 228 Even though this case
was decided in 1998, years before the enactment of Article 301, it
demonstrates that Turkey has a history of abridging individual rights in the
name of territorial integrity and for the promotion of a unified nation. Also,
Article 301 's predecessor, Article 159, was in place at the time Socialist Party
was decided, and it granted the Constitutional Court right to punish anyone
who "publicly insult[ed] or ridicule[d] Turkishness, the Republic, the moral
personality of Parliament, [or] the Government .... 229
Article 301 and the recent prosecutions for non-violent expression
demonstrate that Turkey has not been striking "a fair balance" between the
individual's fundamental right to free expression and its legitimate right to
protect itself in compliance with international obligations under the
Convention.23°
While Turkey has pledged to modify Article 301 in order to make its laws
commensurate with its international obligations, there are those who doubt
Turkey's true commitment to reform.23' Many believe that Turkish prosecutors
and judges have used Article 301 prosecutions as an attempt to undercut the
state's efforts to achieve EU membership.232 Olli Rehn, the European Union
226 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. It could be argued that Article 10 of the
Convention gives Turkey the right to limit freedom of expression in order to protect territorial
integrity or the reputation of the country. However, as demonstrated by Socialist Party,
fundamental rights such as free expression cannot easily be abridged for the sake of territorial
integrity. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
227 Socialist Party, 1998-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1233.
228 Id. at 1259.
229 TORK CEZA KANUNU [TURKISH PENAL CODE] art. 159 (1961), translated in HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 187, at 21. It has been argued that "[t]he 1982 constitution grants
the right of free expression while at the same time qualifying exercise of that right to an absurd
degree." Id.; see supra text accompanying note 91.
230 See Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2548 (stating that the ECHR has to
"ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck between the individual's fundamental right to
freedom of expression and a democratic society's legitimate right to protect itself against
activities of terrorist organisations").
231 See, e.g., HENSLER & MOLLER, supra note 114, at 47 (quoting Orhan Pamuk who claimed
Article 301 was intentionally hidden from the international community).
232 See id. (suggesting the decision to hold Pamuk's trial on the anniversary of the EU's
decision to open membership with Turkey may be intentional provocation).
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Enlargement Commissioner and a Finnish politician, has "suggested that [the
trial of Pamuk] may have been staged as a deliberate challenge to recent
reform trends., 233 The Kurdish Human Rights Project pointed out that the date
of Pamuk's trial, was likely deliberately set for December 16 because this is
the date of the anniversary of the EU's decision to open membership
negotiations with Turkey.234 Arguing that this action was more "provocation"
than "coincidence," Human Rights Watch and Commissioner Rehn has urged
Turkey to be more proactive in controlling prosecutors and judges who "may
well disagree with the government's project of European Union membership
- but [who] are not entitled to express their disagreement by vexatious
prosecutions of individual citizens.
'
"
235
The Commissioner has also called for Turkey to initiate training programs
for prosecutors and judges to ensure that they are interpreting Article 301
consistently with the standards set forth by the Convention.236 Moreover, the
Commissioner expects "the Turkish Government [will take] action to amend
the Code to close such loopholes that give too much room of [sic] discretion
for anti-European interpretations of freedom of expression., 237 Even though
the reformation of Article 301 is just one on a long list of reforms that are
being asked of Turkey in their bid to join the EU, freedom of expression is one
of the most basic rights; thus, limitations Turkey places on this freedom is one
of the main impediments to European membership.
233 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Pamuk Trial Tests Commitment to Free
Speech (Dec. 8, 2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/08/turkeyl2174.htm (citing Olli
Rehn, EU Comm'r of Enlargement). See also Olli Rhen, EU Comm'r of Enlargement,
Accession Negotiations with Turkey: The Time for Celebration is Over, Now Comes the Time
for Delivery, Address Before the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (Nov. 23, 2005)
("[I]t seems like some nationalist-minded prosecutors find it easier to fight a rearguard action
against the reforms through extremely dubious interpretation of the new Penal Code."). Rehn
further suggested that "[i]t should be made clear to prosecutors that Article 301 of the new Penal
Code should be interpreted fully in line with the European Convention of Human Rights.
Training programmes for prosecutors and judges to ensure that they fully internalise these
principles will also be needed." Id.
234 See HENSLER & MCLLER, supra note 114, at 47.
235 Letter from Holly Cartner, Executive Dir., Eur. and Cent. Asia Division, Human Rights
Watch, to Cemil (iqek, Turkish Justice Minister (Sept. 29, 2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/20
05/09/29/turkeyl 1872.htm.
236 Address by Olli Rhen, supra note 233.
237 Id.
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V. THE CURRENT STATE OF ARTICLE 301
On April 23, 2008, in an effort to comply with the EU's requirements for
accession, Turkey's parliament approved a proposal to soften Article 301's
restrictions on free speech. 23' The legislators voted 250-65 in favor of
amending Section 301 of the penal code.239 The most significant change is that
the newer version of the law bars insults to the "Turkish nation," rather than
barring insults to "Turkishness" which was a much more vague offense.240
Other changes include cutting the maximum sentence for denigrating the
Turkish identity or institutions from three years in prison to two, with a
possible suspended sentence for first-time offenders.24' Also, now the Justice
Minister will have to approve investigation of possible violations of the law.242
On May 7, President Abdullah Gul approved the new version of Article 30 1.243
While these changes are substantive, opponents of the changes say "the
government-proposed changes are only cosmetic and will have little impact on
Turkey's EU bid.",2' A pro-Kurdish party lawmaker, Fatma Kurtulan "said it
was 'illusive' to believe that the amendment would advance free speech,
saying that it was designed to please the EU but did not bring substantial
changes., 24 ' Kurtulan asserts that Article 301 needs to be abolished
altogether.246
The threat of failure in accession negotiations, however, has not inspired
the results that many believe it should have-the abolition of Article 301.
Article 301 has been heavily criticized by the EU since its inception in 2005,
and even though Turkey has long since known that the Article has affected its
negotiations with the EU, the country has been in no hurry to abolish the
Article. This forces us to consider why the government is now willing to
concede to the EU's demands to expand democratic rights of the nation's
citizens. Moreover, why has the government supported Article 301 even in the
23 Cf. Turkey'sParliament Eases Free Speech Law, USAToDAY, Apr.30,2008,http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/2008-04-30-turkey-freespeech-n.htm?loc-interstitialskip (discussing
other "freedom-curbing laws ... that need to be changed..
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 President Gfil Signs Amendment to Article 301, TODAY'S ZAMAN, May 9, 2008, http://
www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link= 141368.
24 Turkey's Parliament Eases Free Speech Law, supra note 238.
245 Id.
246 Id.
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face of so much criticism? Many Turks believe that Turkey has not rushed to
do the EU's bidding because of a growing opinion amongst accession
supporters that the EU applies a double standard in its accession
negotiations.247 For example, the European Union admitted Cyprus as a
member even though when the United Nations proposed the Annan Plan to
settle the Cyprus-Turkish dispute over the divided island nation of Cyprus,
"[i]t was the Greek Cypriots who rejected the Annan Plan while the Turkish
Cypriots endorsed it."'248 Even though the Greek Cypriot veto hampered trade,
the European Union told Turkey that unless it fulfills its duties under the
Ankara protocol-a protocol that extends Turkey's customs to the ten new
member states that joined the European Union May 1, 2004-accession
negotiations could be at risk.249 "This sequence of events has created a sense
of unfairness among the Turkish public."2 '0  Regardless of whether one
supports or opposes Article 301, its status remains questionable even today.
In light of the fact that Article 301 is highly criticized in the international
community, Turkey should consider whether there is a better way to achieve
the desired objective of maintaining the integrity of the state while committing
themselves to the human rights standards of the international community.
VI. Is THERE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE?
Turkey is not the first country to promote the curtailment of certain
fundamental rights for the greater good.25 ' The United States grants citizens
the fullest extent of their constitutional rights while retaining a small amount
of control over the content of free expression. There are limited exceptions
when certain speech is not protected because of concern for the public welfare,
such as the use of "fighting words" and expression that incites violence. 2 The
United States has sought to prevent speech that would incite lawlessness and
247 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FURTHER ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU: THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY?, REPORT, 2005-06, H.L. 373, at 58.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
25 See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
252 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,383-84 (1992). This body of law is outside the
scope of this Note but uses various legal standards to allow the government to curtail certain
types of expression, such as incitement of imminent lawless action, fighting words, defamation,
child pornography, and certain forms of commercial speech. See generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005).
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wreak havoc by constructing rules that further state goals but provide
individuals with the maximum rights allowed by the Constitution.253
In America, even though speech is usually protected, "the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." '254 After all,
"[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic.... ,255
This well-developed body of law, which helps to balance the needs of the
public with important individual rights, demonstrates that a country can further
its legitimate state interest and still protect its people from an overreaching
government. The United States'jurisprudence on freedom of expression could
be a model that Turkey could use to amend Article 301 so that it furthers
legitimate state interests and protects the nation's identity while also
promoting stability in the government.
In addition, the ECHR and the Commissioner are willing to uphold some
of the provisions of the penal code, as long as judges and prosecutors in
Turkey ensure that individual prosecutions are conducted within the spirit of
the freedom of expression standards set forth in the Convention. 6
VII. CONCLUSION
By retaining Article 301, Turkey has put itself in a precarious position with
both its allies and the European Union. Understandably, centuries of unrest
have conditioned Turkey to use whatever means possible to maintain control
and unity. Given that democratizing has not been an easy road for Turkey and
in light of the violence that has plagued the region for centuries, one could
argue that Article 301 is the best tool that Turkey has for maintaining peace
and order within the region. One scholar argues, "violent conflicts are most
likely to occur in countries, which are at the early stages of
democratization.... [State building] requires subordination of the groups,
regulating private and public interests.., and establishing a strong autonomy
in use of coercive power., 257 However, Turkey must recognize that freedom
of expression is one of the indispensable elements to a free society and to
individual fulfillment.
253 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
254 See id. (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1904)).
255 Id.
256 Cf. supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
257 Ali Ozdogan, Where Do Terrorists Come From?, in NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGIES 21, 28 (Robert W. Orttung & Andrey Makarychev eds., 2006).
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Those in Turkey who support EU membership must convince the "deep
state," or "the state within the state," that Turkey has "[not] gone far enough
in reforming itself along Western lines to pass the EU membership test. '258
This Note shows that the internal struggle within Turkey to create a national
identity has created a culture that has become synonymous with the
suppression of free speech and other human rights that EU member states are
supposed to hold in high regard. Further, Turkey must follow its own
constitutional guidelines and ensure that the members of its justice system are
committed to making sure that the standards set forth in the Convention are
applicable to all Turkish citizens. With its recent bid to join the EU, Turkey
is clearly trying to assert itself as a world power. The standards set forth by
the Convention ensure that EU member states are those countries that wield
great power without abusing it. Turkey, with its rich history and enduring
spirit, needs to abolish Article 301 and take its place as one of the world's
great countries.
258 Robert Mahoney, As Turkish Nationalists Resist European Tilt, Free Expression Is a Victim,
NATIONALISM AND THE PRESS (Mar. 16, 2006), http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2006/turkey3-06/t
urkey_3-06.html.
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